Discrete-Time Polar Opinion Dynamics with Susceptibility by Liu, Ji et al.
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Ji Liu, Mengbin Ye, Brian D.O. Anderson, Tamer Bas¸ar, Angelia Nedic´
Abstract— This paper considers a discrete-time opinion dy-
namics model in which each individual’s susceptibility to being
influenced by others is dependent on her current opinion.
We assume that the social network has time-varying topology
and that the opinions are scalars on a continuous interval.
We first propose a general opinion dynamics model based
on the DeGroot model, with a general function to describe
the functional dependence of each individual’s susceptibility
on her own opinion, and show that this general model is
analogous to the Friedkin-Johnsen model, which assumes a
constant susceptibility for each individual. We then consider
two specific functions in which the individual’s susceptibility
depends on the polarity of her opinion, and provide motivating
social examples. First, we consider stubborn positives, who
have reduced susceptibility if their opinions are at one end
of the interval and increased susceptibility if their opinions
are at the opposite end. A court jury is used as a motivating
example. Second, we consider stubborn neutrals, who have
reduced susceptibility when their opinions are in the middle of
the spectrum, and our motivating examples are social networks
discussing established social norms or institutionalized behavior.
For each specific susceptibility model, we establish the initial
and graph topology conditions in which consensus is reached,
and develop necessary and sufficient conditions on the initial
conditions for the final consensus value to be at either extreme
of the opinion interval. Simulations are provided to show the
effects of the susceptibility function when compared to the
DeGroot model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of opinion dynamics, which considers how an
individual’s opinion forms and evolves through interactions
with others in a social network, has been widely studied in
the social sciences for decades. The classical discrete-time
DeGroot model, in which each individual updates her opinion
by taking a convex combination of the opinions of her
neighbors at each time step, is perhaps one of the most well
known models [1]. This model is closely related to discrete-
time linear consensus algorithms, which have been heav-
ily studied in multi-agent coordination literature [2]–[11].
Since the time the DeGroot model was proposed, numerous
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other models have been introduced, in both continuous- and
discrete-time setting. These various models, which describe
the opinion formation process in the context of different
social cognitive processes, all attempt to understand the
formation and evolution of opinions in social networks of
all sizes, and explain observed social phenomena such as
polarization or attitude extremity [12]–[15], and subculture
formation [16], [17].
There are many variants of the DeGroot model for opinion
dynamics. The Altafini model, which suggests the interac-
tions between individuals can be cooperative or antagonistic,
has been studied as a discrete-time process in [18]–[21],
and the continuous-time counterpart has been considered in
[22]–[25]. It is notable because the model links the limiting
opinion behavior with the structural balance of the graph
representing the social network. Some other models primarily
focus on linking the limiting opinion behavior with a social
process. For example, the Hegselmann-Krause model shows
the social cognitive process of homophily is linked to fact
that opinions in the social network eventually form clusters
[26]–[28]. It was shown in [16] that an individual’s desire to
strive for uniqueness generated persistent subcultures which
formed and vanished over time. On the other hand, an
individual conforming to a social norm generated pluralistic
ignorance [17]. Finally, some models attempt to link final
opinion behavior to a combination of social processes and the
underlying network structure. The Friedkin-Johnsen model
[29], [30] considered individual susceptibility to influence
and shows that opinions reach a persistent diversity under
general graph structures. The DeGroot-Friedkin model [31]
studied an individual’s ability to reflect on her impact in
the opinion formation process, and showed her social power
depended on the graph structure.
A key aspect of the DeGroot model is the interpersonal
influence, which describes the amount of influence each
individual’s neighbors have in determining that individual’s
new opinion. Some of the results consider arbitrary, time-
varying interpersonal influence, e.g. [6], [19], [24]. How-
ever, many of the aforementioned models consider influence
determined by a social process, e.g. homophily [28], social
distancing [16], [17], conformity [17], desire for uniqueness
[16], biased assimilation [32], or reflected self-appraisal [31].
Because the social process is often dependent on the states,
i.e. opinions (which change with time), then necessarily the
interpersonal influences are state-dependent, and thus time-
varying. In a recent paper [33], a continuous-time model
has been proposed for fixed social network topology which
considers, separately, three different cognitive processes to
drive the influence change. In [33], the term “polar opinion
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dynamics” relates to the fact that the level of influence is
dependent on how extreme, i.e. polar, an individual’s opinion
is.
In this paper, we study a discrete-time opinion dynamics
model where an individual’s susceptibility to influence is
dependent on her current opinion, and allow the social
network topology to vary over time. We first propose a
general model, show it can be considered as a generalization
of both the DeGroot model and the Friedkin-Johnsen model
[29], [30], and establish some general properties of the
model. We then investigate discrete-time versions of two
of the three cognitive process introduced in [33], bearing
in mind that discrete-time models are more appropriate to
describe opinion dynamics, at least from the point that
individuals change their minds from time to time, instead of
continuously. In addition, we provide social examples from
existing literature to motivate these susceptibility functions.
For each function, we provide sufficient conditions on the
graph topology and initial opinions for the social network to
reach a consensus. Importantly, we establish necessary and
sufficient conditions for the social network to hold opinions
at either extremes of the opinion interval, whereas [33]
provided only sufficient conditions, or no conditions at all
for extremity of the final consensus in the continuous-time
model. Lastly, it turns out that while some of the limiting
behaviors are similar to the continuous-time model, in other
cases, the limiting behaviors are not the same.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Some
notations and preliminaries are introduced in Section I-A. In
Section II, the discrete-time polar opinion dynamics model
with susceptibility is introduced. The main results of the
paper are presented in Section III, which are illustrated
and compared with the DeGroot model via simulations in
Section IV. The paper ends with some concluding remarks
in Section V.
A. Preliminaries
For any positive integer n, we use [n] to denote the index
set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We view vectors as column vectors and
write x> to denote the transpose of a vector x. For a vector
x, we use xi to denote the ith entry of x. For any matrix M ∈
Rn×n, we use mij to denote its ijth entry. A nonnegative
n × n matrix is called a stochastic matrix if its row sums
are all equal to 1. We use 0 and 1 to denote the vectors
whose entries all equal 0 and 1, respectively, and I to denote
the identity matrix, while the dimensions of the vectors and
matrices are to be understood from the context. For any real
number x, we use |x| to denote the absolute value of x. For
any two real vectors a, b ∈ IRn, we write a ≥ b if ai ≥ bi
for all i ∈ [n], a > b if a ≥ b and a 6= b, and a  b if
ai > bi for all i ∈ [n]. For any two sets A and B, we use
A \ B to denote the set of elements in A but not in B. The
graph of an n × n matrix M with real-valued entries is an
n-vertex directed graph defined so that (i, j) is an arc from
vertex i to vertex j in the graph whenever the jith entry
of M is nonzero. We will use the terms “individual” and
“agent” interchangeably.
II. THE GENERAL MODEL
In this section, we propose a general model for describing
opinion dynamics where each individual’s susceptibility to
being influenced by others is affected by some social process,
and give some results on the trajectories of the opinions. In
the next section, we shall propose two specific models to
describe two different variants of a social process.
Consider a social network of n > 1 agents, labeled 1
through n, discussing opinions on a given topic.1 Each agent
i can only learn, and be influenced by, the opinions of
certain other agents called the neighbors of agent i. Neighbor
relationships among the n agents are described by a directed
graph N(t), called the neighbor graph, which may change
over time. Agent j is a neighbor of agent i at time t whenever
(j, i) is an arc in N(t). Thus, the directions of arcs indicate
the directions of information flow (specifically opinion flow).
For convenience, we assume that each agent is always a
neighbor of herself. Thus, N(t) has self-arcs at all n vertices
for all time t. Each agent i has control over a real-valued
quantity xi, called agent i’s opinion.
In the time-varying DeGroot model2, each agent i updates
her opinion at each discrete time t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} by setting
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t), i ∈ [n], (1)
where Ni(t) denotes the set of neighbors of agent i at time t
including i herself, and wij(t) are positive influence weights
satisfying
∑
j∈Ni(t) wij(t) = 1 for all i ∈ [n] and time t. We
assume that the weights wij(t) change in a manner which
is entirely independent of xk(t),∀ k ∈ [n]. We rewrite the
above model as
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) +
 ∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t)− xi(t)

= xi(t) +
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t) (xj(t)− xi(t)) ,
with the second equality obtained by noting that∑
j∈Ni(t) wij(t) = 1, and define
ui(t) =
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t) (xj(t)− xi(t)) .
Then, ui(t) represents the influence of agent i’s neighbors,
which generates a change in the opinion of agent i, i.e.
ui(t) can be viewed as the control input of agent i at time
t. We now suppose that agent i may not fully accept the
influence of her neighbors, and her openness to influence,
or susceptibility, is captured by the real-valued function
fi(xi(t)). We make the following assumption on fi(xi(t)):
Assumption 1: The susceptibility function fi(xi(t)) takes
on values in [0, 1].
1 The purpose of labeling of the agents is only for convenience. We do
not require a global labeling of the agents in the network. We only assume
that each agent can identify her own neighbors.
2The original DeGroot model was proposed for a fixed graph [1].
Subsequent results expanded this to time-varying graphs, e.g. [3], [6].
We consider the following model for opinion dynamics with
susceptibility:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + fi(xi(t))
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t) (xj(t)− xi(t)) .
(2)
If at time t fi(xi(t)) = 1, agent i fully accepts her neighbors’
influence at time t, and the model reduces to the DeGroot
model. In the case when fi(xi(t)) = 0, agent i will ignore
her neighbors and not change her opinion at time t; in such
a case, the agent is sometimes called stubborn [29], [34]. It
is worth emphasizing that an agent’s susceptibility function
depends on its current opinion, i.e. state. This is consistent
with the many works discussed in the introduction, which
considers social cognitive processes which are dependent on
the individual’s opinion and, in some instances, the opinions
of her neighbor.
There is also another interpretation of the model. Inspired
by the Friedkin-Johnsen model [29], [30], [35], we assume
that each agent i updates her opinion as a convex combi-
nation of her own opinion and the weighted average of her
neighbors’ opinions;3 specifically,
xi(t+ 1) = λi
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t) + (1− λi)xi(t), (3)
where the constant λi ∈ [0, 1] is agent i’s susceptibility or
openness to being influenced by her neighbors’ opinions. Let
us replace λi with the state-dependent susceptibility function
fi(xi(t)). It follows that
xi(t+ 1)
= fi(xi(t))
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t) + (1− fi(xi(t)))xi(t) (4)
= xi(t)− fi(xi(t))
xi(t)− ∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t)

= xi(t)− fi(xi(t))
 ∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t) (xi(t)− xj(t))

= xi(t) + fi(xi(t))ui(t),
which is the same as (2).
Remark 1: We note here that there are two types of time-
dependency in the influence term ui(t). Firstly, we have as-
sumed that the influence weights wij(t) may be time-varying
but state-independent. This may occur in situations where
an individual decides to at time t, stop sharing her opinion,
stop listening to certain neighbors, start listening to other
neighbors, or adjust weight magnitudes (perhaps by becom-
ing more persuasive) etc. This differs from the continuous-
time work in [33], which considered static influence weights.
The second is time-dependency arising from the fact that the
susceptibility of individual i, fi(xi(t)), is state-dependent. In
the Friedkin-Johnsen model, susceptibility was assumed to be
constant. While some papers have studied state-dependent
3 In the Friedkin-Johnsen model, xi(t) of the second term on the right
of (3) is replaced by xi(0).
susceptibility in discrete-time models, they provide only
simulations, and have not provided rigorous analysis or
considered time-varying influence weights wij(t) [17]. 
In this paper, we assume that all the initial opinions xi(0),
i ∈ [n], lie in the interval [−1, 1], where −1 and 1 represent
the extreme positive and negative opinions, respectively.
Such a scaling is typical in opinion dynamics problems where
xi may represent individual i’s attitude towards an idea,
e.g. the legalization of recreational marijuana, with xi = 1
maximally supportive and xi = −1 maximally opposing.
The following lemma shows that [−1, 1] is an invariant set
of each agent’s opinion dynamics given by (2).
Lemma 1: Suppose that each agent i follows the update
rule (2) and that xi(0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ [n]. Then, xi(t) ∈
[−1, 1] for all i ∈ [n] and time t.
Proof: From (4) and the assumption that fi(xi(t)) ∈
[0, 1], each agent i’s updated value xi(t + 1) is a convex
combination of xi(t) and
∑
j∈Ni(t) wij(t)xj(t); i.e. a convex
combination of the current opinions of her neighbors. Using
induction, it is easy to see that if xi(0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all
i ∈ [n], it follows that xi(t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ [n] and
time t.
This shows that individual i’s opinion will remain bounded
from above and below, and ensures that an individual’s
opinion cannot become increasingly extreme in either the
positive or negative direction. More can be said about the
most extreme opinions in the social network. Specifically,
the most negative and positive opinions will never become
more negative and more positive, respectively.
Lemma 2: Suppose that each agent i follows the update
rule (2). Then, xmin(t) = mini xi(t) is nondecreasing and
xmax(t) = maxi xi(t) is nonincreasing as t increases.
Proof: From (2), it follows that
xi(t+ 1)
= xi(t) + fi(xi(t))
 ∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t)− xi(t)

= (1− fi(xi(t)))xi(t) + fi(xi(t))
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t)
The above set of n equations can be combined into state
form. Toward this end, let x(t) be the vector in IRn whose
ith entry equals xi(t), F (x(t)) be the n×n diagonal matrix
whose ith diagonal entry equals fi(xi(t)) with 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1,
and W (t) be the n×n matrix whose ijth entry equals wij(t).
Then, it follows that
x(t+ 1) = (I − F (x(t)))x(t) + F (x(t))W (t)x(t)
= S(x(t), t)x(t), (5)
where
S(x(t), t) = I − F (x(t)) + F (x(t))W (t).
It is worth noting that S(x(t), t) is a function of x(t)
as F (x(t)) is so. Thus, (5) is a nonlinear system. From
Lemma 1 and Assumption 2, S(x(t), t) is a nonnegative
matrix for all time t. Since W (t) is a stochastic matrix, it
follows that
S(x(t), t)1 = (I − F (x(t)) + F (x(t))W (t))1
= 1− F (x(t))1 + F (x(t))1
= 1,
which implies that S(x(t), t) is a stochastic matrix for all
time t. Thus, each xi(t+ 1) is a convex combination of all
xi(t), i ∈ [n], which implies that xmin(t) = mini xi(t) is
nondecreasing and xmax(t) = maxi xi(t) is nonincreasing
as t increases.
We also impose the following set of assumptions on the
weights wij(t) throughout the rest of the paper.
Assumption 2: For all i ∈ [n] and t, there hold wij(t) >
0 if j ∈ Ni(t) and wij(t) = 0 otherwise. There exists a
positive number β such that, for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ Ni(t),
if wij 6= 0, then wij ≥ β. For all i ∈ [n] and t, there holds∑
j∈Ni(t) wij(t) = 1.
Such a set of assumptions implies that W (t) = [wij(t)] is
a stochastic matrix for all time t, and was widely used in the
DeGroot (and consensus) studies [11]. For the (time-varying)
DeGroot model (1), we have a standard result, which we state
after first defining some connectivity conditions for time-
varying graphs.
A directed graph G is strongly connected if there is
a directed path between each pair of its distinct ver-
tices. We say that a finite sequence of directed graphs
G1,G2, . . . ,Gm with the same vertex set is jointly strongly
connected if the union4 of the directed graphs in this
sequence is strongly connected. We say that an infinite
sequence of directed graphs G1,G2, . . . with the same
vertex set is repeatedly jointly strongly connected if there
exist positive integers p and q for which each finite se-
quence Gq+kp,Gq+kp+1, . . . ,Gq+(k+1)p−1, k ≥ 0, is jointly
strongly connected. Repeatedly jointly strongly connected
graphs are equivalent to so-called “B-connected” graphs in
the consensus literature [36] whose definition is in a slightly
different form.
Proposition 1: (Theorem 2 in [11]) Suppose that As-
sumption 2 holds. If the sequence of neighbor graphs
N(1),N(2), . . . is repeatedly jointly strongly connected5,
then all xi(t), i ∈ [n], in (1) will reach a consensus
exponentially fast as t→∞ for all initial conditions.
It is worth noting that for each time t, neighbor graph N(t)
is the same as the graph of weight matrix W (t) = [wij(t)].
We will use this result in our analysis of the model (2).
III. SUSCEPTIBILITY FUNCTIONS
In this section, we will consider two specific susceptibil-
ity functions, and study the behavior of the corresponding
models. We give motivating examples from sociology for
the susceptibility functions taking on these specific forms.
4 The union of a finite sequence of directed graphs with the same vertex
set is a directed graph with the same vertex set and the arc set which is the
union of the arc sets of all directed graphs in the sequence.
5 The result still holds if N(1),N(2), . . . is repeatedly jointly rooted [10].
A. Stubborn Positives
We begin with the case where fi(xi(t)) = 12 (1 − xi(t)),
for all i ∈ [1]. An agent which has this susceptibility function
is called a stubborn positive.
Motivation: Note here that for stubborn positive agents,
her susceptibility decreases as xi → 1, and increases as
xi → −1. In other words, the closer the agent is to a “pos-
itive opinion” (respectively a “negative opinion”), the more
stubborn or unwilling (respectively more open or susceptible)
she is to changing her opinion. Our motivating example is
a jury panel. The paper [37] conducted extensive surveys of
criminal juries after trials were complete. A clear pattern was
observed: a juror was more likely to be extremely stubborn
when believing the defendant should be acquitted, than when
believing the defendant should be convicted. In our context,
a juror with xi = 1 is maximally supportive of acquitting
the defendant, while a juror with xi = −1 is maximally
opposing acquittal (and thus supportive of convicting)6. It
was suggested that this asymmetric stubbornness arose from
the fact that a false conviction carried an enormous amount
of consequence for defendants in criminal cases, e.g. a
prison sentence. In summary, scenarios which involve social
networks with stubborn positives can arise in discussions
where the outcome for one result has drastically different
severity of consequences compared to the opposite result.
Analysis: In this case, from (2), each agent i updates her
opinion by setting
xi(t+ 1)
= xi(t) +
1
2
(1− xi(t))
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t) (xj(t)− xi(t))
= xi(t) +
1
2
(1− xi(t))
 ∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t)− xi(t)

=
1
2
(1 + xi(t))xi(t) +
1
2
(1− xi(t))
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t).
(6)
It follows that
x(t+ 1) =
1
2
(I +X(t))x(t) +
1
2
(I −X(t))W (t)x(t)
=
(
1
2
(I +X(t)) +
1
2
(I −X(t))W (t)
)
x(t),
(7)
where X(t) is the n×n diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal
entry equals xi(t).
The following theorem characterizes the limiting behavior
of system (7).
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that the
sequence of neighbor graphs N(1),N(2), . . . is repeatedly
jointly strongly connected. If xi(0) < 1 for all i ∈ [n], then
all xi(t), i ∈ [n], in (6) will reach a consensus exponentially
6We note here that this is the opinion of the juror, as opposed to the final
action taken by the juror. An individual may privately take one opinion and
express another due to the social circumstances [38].
fast at some value in the interval [−1, 1); moreover, in this
case, the consensus value equals −1 if, and only if, xi(0) =
−1 for all i ∈ [n]. If xi(0) = 1 for at least one i ∈ [n], then
all xi(t), i ∈ [n], in (6) will reach a consensus at value 1.
Proof: From (7), x(t+ 1) = S(x(t), t)x(t) where
S(x(t), t) =
1
2
(I +X(t)) +
1
2
(I −X(t))W (t). (8)
From the proof of Lemma 2, S(x(t), t) is a stochastic matrix
for all time t.
First suppose that xi(0) < 1 for all i ∈ [n]. There must
exist a positive number α such that xi(0) ≤ 1 − α for all
i ∈ [n]. It follows from Lemma 2 that xi(t) ≤ 1 − α for
all i ∈ [n] and time t. From (8), we obtain the following
two inequalities for sij(t), the entries of S(x(t), t). For each
diagonal entry,
sii(t) =
1
2
(1 + xi(t)) +
1
2
(1− xi(t))wii(t)
≥ 1
2
(1− xi(t))wii(t)
≥ 1
2
αβ,
where the last inequality makes use of Assumption 2 and the
fact that we assumed every node in N(t) has a self-loop, for
all t. For each off-diagonal entry,
sij(t) =
1
2
(1− xi(t))wij(t).
Thus, sij(t) is nonzero if and only if wij(t) is nonzero
(because 1 − xi(t) ≥ α > 0), which implies that the graph
of S(x(t), t) has the same edge and vertex set (but with
different edge weights) as the graph of W (t), as well as
neighbor graph N(t). Moreover, it can be seen that when
sij(t) > 0, it must hold that sij(t) ≥ 12αβ. From Proposition
1, all xi(t), i ∈ [n], will reach a consensus exponentially fast.
Since −1 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1 − α for all i ∈ [n] and time t, the
consensus value must lie in [−1, 1).
Next we show that all xi(t), i ∈ [n], in (6) will reach
a consensus at value −1 if and only if xi(0) = −1 for all
i ∈ [n]. Suppose that, to the contrary, there exists at least one
i ∈ [n] such that xi(0) > −1. From (6), since xj(t) ≥ −1
for all j ∈ Ni(t), there holds
xi(t+ 1) ≥ 1
2
(1 + xi(t))xi(t)− 1
2
(1− xi(t)).
Suppose that xi(t) > −1. Then, it follows that
xi(t+ 1) > −1
2
(1 + xi(t))− 1
2
(1− xi(t)) = −1,
which implies that if xi(0) > −1, then xi(t) > −1 for
all t. Let S(t) denote the set of agents whose opinions
are greater than −1 at time t. From the hypothesis and
preceding discussion, S(t) is nonempty for all time t. Let
S¯(t) = [n] \ S(t) be the set of agents whose opinions equal
−1 at time t. If S¯(t) is empty, i.e., xi(0) > −1 for all i ∈ [n],
then from Lemma 2, the system cannot reach a consensus at
−1. Suppose that S¯(t) is nonempty, i.e., there exists at least
one agent whose initial opinion is −1. Since the sequence
of neighbor graphs is repeatedly jointly strongly connected,
there must exist a finite time τ and an agent j ∈ S¯(τ)
such that it has a neighbor k ∈ S(τ), i.e., xj(τ) = −1
and xk(τ) > −1 with k ∈ Nj(τ). From (6), it can be seen
that xj(τ+1) > −1. Using the same arguments, there exists
a finite time τ¯ such that xi(τ¯) > −1 for all i ∈ [n], which
contradicts the hypothesis that all xi(t), i ∈ [n], will reach
a consensus at −1. Therefore, the consensus at −1 will be
reached if and only if xi(0) = −1 for all i ∈ [n].
Now we consider the case when xi(0) = 1 for at least one
i ∈ [n]. Consider the Lyapunov function
V (x(t)) = 1− min
i∈[n]
xi(t).
From (6), if xi(t) = 1, then xi(t + 1) = 1, which implies
that if xi(0) = 1, then xi(t) = 1 for all time t. Thus, if
xi(t) = 1 for all i ∈ [n] at some time t, then V (x(t)) =
0 and V (x(t + 1)) = 0. Suppose that there exists at least
one agent i such that xi(t) < 1 at a specific time t. In
this case, mini∈[n] xi(t) < 1 and thus V (x(t)) > 0. From
Lemma 2, there holds xj(τ) ≥ mini∈[n] xi(t) for all j ∈ [n]
and τ ≥ t. LetM(t) be the set of agents whose opinions are
the smallest at time t, i.e., xj(t) = mini∈[n] xi(t) for each
j ∈M(t). Since xi(0) = 1 for at least one i ∈ [n], it follows
that [n] \ M(t) is nonempty for all t. Since the sequence
of neighbor graphs is repeatedly jointly strongly connected,
there must exist a finite time τ ≥ t and an agent j ∈M(τ)
such that it has a neighbor k /∈ M(τ), i.e., xk(τ) > xj(τ)
with k ∈ Nj(τ) (else the agents of ∪∞t≥0M(t) would induce
a disconnected subgraph, which contradicts the repeatedly
jointly strongly connected nature of the neighbor graphs).
From (6), it can be seen that xj(τ + 1) > xj(τ). Using
the same arguments, there must exist a finite time τ¯ > t
such that mini∈[n] xi(τ¯) > mini∈[n] xi(t), which implies that
V (x(τ¯)) < V (x(t)). Therefore, xi(t) will converge to 1 for
all i ∈ [n].
Theorem 1 implies that system (7) will reach a consensus
for any initial condition. Necessary and sufficient conditions
for the two extreme opinions are also given. Specifically, the
consensus will be reached at −1 if and only if x(0) = −1,
and at 1 if and only if x(0) 1 does not hold.
Remark 2: The discrete-time model with stubborn posi-
tives has the same limiting behavior as the continuous-time
model considered in [33]. We consider the general time-
varying case whereas only the time-invariant case was stud-
ied in [33]. Moreover, we establish necessary and sufficient
conditions for the two extreme opinions, i.e., −1 and 1,
whereas only consensus to 1 was studied in [33]. 
Remark 3: We now compare the discrete-time model with
stubborn positives (6) with the original DeGroot model (1)
for the case in which the neighbor graph does not change
over time and is a strongly connected graph N. Thus, the
corresponding weight matrix W is also time-invariant. Since
N is strongly connected, W is irreducible. It is well known
that in this case, all xi(t), i ∈ [n], in the DeGroot model will
reach a consensus at value c>x(0), where c> is the unique
left eigenvector of W associated with eigenvalue 1 which
satisfies c>1 = 1; moreover, c  0. Therefore, as long as
there exists at least one agent i for which xi(0) < 1, all
the agents will not reach a consensus at value 1. This is a
significant difference from the model (6) in which as long
as at least one agent has initial opinion at 1, all the agents’
opinions will converge to 1. 
B. Stubborn Neutrals
Now we consider the case where each individual has
susceptibility function fi(xi(t)) = xi(t)2. We call such an
individual a stubborn neutral.
Motivation: Observe that for stubborn neutral agents, her
susceptibility to being influenced decreases as xi → 0,
and increases as xi → ±1. This means that the closer the
individual’s opinion is to “neutral”, i.e. xi = 0, the more
stubborn she becomes. In networks with stubborn neutrals,
we consider the neutral opinion as an established, socially
normative opinion. For an illustrative example, suppose that
the topic was on the level of environmental regulations, e.g.
for nuclear power. Then xi = 0 represents individual i
favoring the maintaining of the status quo, xi = 1 represents
favoring increasing regulation, and xi = −1 represents
favoring of decreasing regulation. Some literature showed
that pressures existed on individuals in a social network to
conform with the group norm [38], [39], with deviants being
punished [40] or receiving additional pressure to conform
[41]. Merei showed in [42] that established traditions heav-
ily influenced the behavior of individuals despite a strong
leader attempting to influence change. In the context of our
paper, tradition is x = 0 and the leader is an individual
i with xi(0) = ±1, and with wji large, for any individual
j who listens to the leader. Lastly, institutionalization has
been linked to the persistence of cultures and resistance to
changing the status quo [43]. In summary, stubborn neutrals
may occur in social networks where individuals are reluctant
to change from the established norm because of associated
risks, or due to institutionalization, or because of pressure to
conform.
Analysis: In this case, from (2), each agent i updates her
opinion by setting
xi(t+ 1)
= xi(t) + xi(t)
2
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t) (xj(t)− xi(t))
= xi(t) + xi(t)
2
 ∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t)− xi(t)

= xi(t)− xi(t)3 + xi(t)2
∑
j∈Ni(t)
wij(t)xj(t). (9)
Then, it follows that
x(t+ 1) =
(
I −X(t)2 +X(t)2W (t))x(t). (10)
The following theorem characterizes some limiting behavior
of system (10).
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that the
sequence of neighbor graphs N(1),N(2), . . . is repeatedly
jointly strongly connected. If xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ [n], then
all xi(t), i ∈ [n], in (9) will reach a consensus exponentially
fast at some value in the interval (0, 1]; moreover, in this
case, the consensus value equals 1 if, and only if, xi(0) = 1
for all i ∈ [n]. If xi(0) < 0 for all i ∈ [n], then all xi(t),
i ∈ [n], in (9) will reach a consensus exponentially fast at
some value in the interval [−1, 0); moreover, in this case,
the consensus value equals −1 if, and only if, xi(0) = −1
for all i ∈ [n].
Proof: From (10), x(t+ 1) = S(x(t), t)x(t) where
S(x(t), t) = I −X(t)2 +X(t)2W (t). (11)
From the proof of Lemma 2, S(x(t), t) is a stochastic matrix
for all time t.
First suppose that xi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ [n]. There must
exist a positive number α such that xi(0) ≥ α for all i ∈ [n].
It follows from Lemma 2 that xi(t) ≥ α for all i ∈ [n] and
time t. From (11), we obtain the following two inequalities
for sij(t), the entries of S(x(t), t). For each diagonal entry,
sii(t) = 1− xi(t)2 + xi(t)2wii(t)
≥ xi(t)2wii(t)
≥ α2β,
where the last inequality makes use of Assumption 2 and the
fact that we assumed every node in N(t) has a self-loop, for
all t. For each off-diagonal entry,
sij(t) = xi(t)
2wij(t).
Thus, sij(t) is nonzero if and only if wij(t) is nonzero, which
implies that the graph of S(x(t), t) is the same as the graph
of W (t), as well as neighbor graph N(t). Moreover, it can
be seen that when sij(t) > 0, it must hold that sij(t) ≥ α2β.
From Proposition 1, all xi(t), i ∈ [n], will reach a consensus
exponentially fast. Since xi(t) ≥ α for all i ∈ [n] and time
t, the consensus value must lie in (0, 1].
Next we show that all xi(t), i ∈ [n], in (9) will reach a
consensus at value 1 if and only if xi(0) = 1 for all i ∈ [n].
Suppose that, to the contrary, there exists at least one i ∈ [n]
such that 0 < xi(0) < 1. From (9), since xj(t) ≤ 1 for all
j ∈ Ni(t) implies
∑
j∈Ni(t) wij(t)xj(t) ≤ 1, there holds
xi(t+ 1) ≤ xi(t)− xi(t)3 + xi(t)2.
It can be verified that xi(t) − xi(t)3 + xi(t)2 increases as
xi(t) increases when xi(t) ∈ (− 13 , 1) and assumes the value
1 at xi(t) = 1. Suppose that 0 < xi(t) < 1. Then, it follows
that xi(t + 1) < 1, which implies that if xi(0) < 1, then
xi(t) < 1 for all t. Let S(t) denote the set of agents whose
opinions are less than 1 at time t. From the hypothesis and
preceding discussion, S(t) is nonempty for all time t. Let
S¯(t) = [n] \ S(t) be the set of agents whose opinions equal
1 at time t. If S¯(t) is empty, i.e., xi(0) < 1 for all i ∈ [n],
then from Lemma 2, the system cannot reach a consensus at
1. Suppose that S¯(t) is nonempty, i.e., there exists at least
one agent whose initial opinion is 1. Since the sequence
of neighbor graphs is repeatedly jointly strongly connected,
there must exist a finite time τ and an agent j ∈ S¯(τ) such
that it has a neighbor k ∈ S(τ), i.e., xj(τ) = 1 and xk(τ) <
1 with k ∈ Nj(τ). From (9), and with i replaced by j, it can
be seen that xj(τ +1) < 1. Using the same arguments, there
exists a finite time τ¯ such that xi(τ¯) < 1 for all i ∈ [n],
which contradicts the hypothesis that all xi(t), i ∈ [n], will
reach a consensus at 1. Therefore, the consensus at 1 will be
reached if and only if xi(0) = 1 for all i ∈ [n].
Now suppose that xi(0) < 0 for all i ∈ [n]. There must
exist a positive number α such that |xi(0)| ≥ α (i.e., xi(0) ≤
−α) for all i ∈ [n]. It follows from Lemma 2 that |xi(t)| ≥ α
(i.e., xi(t) ≤ −α) for all i ∈ [n] and time t. From (11), we
obtain the following two inequalities for sij(t), the entries
of S(x(t), t). For each diagonal entry,
sii(t) = 1− xi(t)2 + xi(t)2wii(t)
≥ xi(t)2wii(t)
≥ α2β,
where the last inequality makes use of Assumption 2. For
each off-diagonal entry,
sij(t) = xi(t)
2wij(t).
Thus, sij(t) is nonzero if and only if wij(t) is nonzero, which
implies that the graph of S(x(t), t) is the same as the graph
of W (t), as well as neighbor graph N(t). Moreover, it can
be seen that when sij(t) > 0, it must hold that sij(t) ≥ α2β.
From Proposition 1, all xi(t), i ∈ [n], will reach a consensus
exponentially fast. Since xi(t) ≤ −α for all i ∈ [n] and time
t, the consensus value must lie in [−1, 0).
Next we show that all xi(t), i ∈ [n], in (9) will reach
a consensus at value −1 if and only if xi(0) = −1 for all
i ∈ [n]. Suppose that, to the contrary, there exists at least one
i ∈ [n] such that −1 < xi(0) < 0. From (9), since xj(t) ≥
−1 for all j ∈ Ni(t) implies
∑
j∈Ni(t) wij(t)xj(t) ≥ −1,
there holds
xi(t+ 1) ≥ xi(t)− xi(t)3 − xi(t)2.
It can be verified that xi(t) − xi(t)3 + xi(t)2 increases
as xi(t) increases when xi(t) ∈ (−1, 13 ). Suppose that−1 < xi(t) < 0. Then, it follows that xi(t+1) > −1, which
implies that if xi(0) > −1, then xi(t) > −1 for all t. Let
S(t) denote the set of agents whose opinions are greater than
−1 at time t. From the hypothesis and preceding discussion,
S(t) is nonempty for all time t. Let S¯(t) = [n]\S(t) be the
set of agents whose opinions equal −1 at time t. If S¯(t) is
empty, i.e., xi(0) > −1 for all i ∈ [n], then from Lemma
2, the system cannot reach a consensus at −1. Suppose that
S¯(t) is nonempty, i.e., there exists at least one agent whose
initial opinion is −1. Since the sequence of neighbor graphs
is repeatedly jointly strongly connected, there must exist a
finite time τ and an agent j ∈ S¯(τ) such that it has a
neighbor k ∈ S(τ), i.e., xj(τ) = −1 and xk(τ) > −1 with
k ∈ Nj(τ). From (9), and with i replaced by j, it can be
seen that xj(τ + 1) > −1. Using the same arguments, there
exists a finite time τ¯ such that xi(τ¯) > −1 for all i ∈ [n],
which contradicts the hypothesis that all xi(t), i ∈ [n], will
reach a consensus at −1. Therefore, the consensus at −1 will
be reached if and only if xi(0) = −1 for all i ∈ [n].
Remark 4: It should be noted that Theorem 2 does not
consider the case where there exist i, j ∈ [n] such that
xi(0) > 0 and xj(0) < 0. It has been shown in [33] that for
this case, the continuous-time model has limt→∞ x(t) = 0.
However, this is not always the case for the discrete-time
model with stubborn neutrals, as we will show shortly, since
in discrete-time, the opinion of an agent i can jump from
xi(t) > 0 to xi(t + 1) < 0, but this is not possible in the
continuous-time case. Although we will only characterize
partial limiting behavior of the discrete-time model for
this case (see Theorem 3), we consider the general time-
varying graph case whereas only the time-invariant graph
case was studied in [33]. Moreover, we establish necessary
and sufficient conditions for the two extreme opinions, i.e.,
−1 and 1, which were not provided in [33]. 
The following example shows that the discrete-time model
with stubborn neutrals (9) has different limiting behaviors
from the continuous-time model considered in [33] (cf.
Theorem 5 in [33]).
Example 1: Suppose that there are 4 agents labeled 1
through 4. The neighbor graph is a complete graph and all
the weights equal 14 . Suppose that the initial opinions are
x1(0) = 1 and xi(0) = −1 for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Thus,
W =

1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
 , x(0) =

1
−1
−1
−1
 .
From (9), xi(1) = − 12 for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, i.e., all the
agents reach a consensus at − 12 . Similarly, if x1(0) = −1
and xi(0) = 1 for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}, with the same weight matrix,
all the agents will reach a consensus at 12 . Therefore, in the
case when initial opinions contain both positive and negative
values, the consensus value can be positive, negative, or zero
(as shown in Theorem 3), depending on initial values, as well
as the neighbor graph topology. 
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that the
sequence of neighbor graphs N(1),N(2), . . . is repeatedly
jointly strongly connected. If xi(0) = 0 for at least one
i ∈ [n], then all xi(t), i ∈ [n], in (9) will reach a consensus
at value 0.
Proof: From (9), if xi(t) = 0, then xi(t + 1) = 0 and
thus xi(τ) = 0 for all τ ≥ t. If all the initial opinions equal
0, the theorem is clearly true. Suppose therefore that there
exists at least one agent whose initial opinion does not equal
0. Consider the Lyapunov function
V (x(t)) = max
i∈[n]
|xi(t)|.
From the preceding discussion, if xi(0) = 0, then xi(t) = 0
for all time t. Thus, if xi(t) = 0 for all i ∈ [n] at some time
t, then V (x(t)) = 0 and V (x(t+ 1)) = 0. Since there exists
at least one agent whose opinion initially equals 0 and thus
keeps at 0, system (10) cannot reach any consensus state
(i.e., a state at which all the agents have the same opinion)
except for 0. From Lemma 2, V (x(t + 1)) ≤ V (x(t)).
Consider a specific time t. Let j be any agent such that
|xj(t)| 6= V (x(t)), which implies that |xj(t)| < V (x(t)) ≤
1. From the second equality in (9), it can be verified that
|xj(t + 1)| < V (x(t)). Let i be any agent such that
|xi(t)| = V (x(t)). First consider the case when xi(t) > 0,
which implies that xi(t) = maxk∈[n] xk(t). Let M(τ) be
the set of agents whose opinions are the largest at time τ ,
i.e., xj(τ) = maxk∈[n] xk(τ) for each j ∈ M(τ). Since
xi(0) = 0 for at least one i ∈ [n], it follows that [n]\M(τ) is
nonempty unless all the agents reach a consensus at 0 at time
τ . Since the sequence of neighbor graphs is repeatedly jointly
strongly connected, there must exist a finite time τ ≥ t and
an agent j ∈ M(τ) such that it has a neighbor k /∈ M(τ),
i.e., xk(τ) < xj(τ) with k ∈ Nj(τ). From the second
equality in (9), with i replaced by j, it can be seen that
xj(τ + 1) < xj(τ), which implies that V (x(τ)) < V (x(t)).
Similarly, the case when xi(t) < 0, there must exist a finite
time τ¯ > t such that V (x(τ¯)) < V (x(t)). Therefore, xi(t)
will converge to 0 for all i ∈ [n].
IV. SIMULATIONS
We now provide a simple simulation example to highlight
the effects of the susceptibility function fi(xi(t)) when com-
pared to the original DeGroot model. We generate a social
network with n = 30 individuals, whose graph is strongly
connected, and with randomly selected influence weights wij
which we have assumed are time-invariant for simplicity. We
omit showing the W matrix due to spatial limitations. The
initial conditions are sampled from a uniform distribution in
the interval (0, 1). For the same graph and initial conditions,
we simulated 1) the opinion dynamics as modeled by the
original DeGroot process, i.e. fi(xi(t)) = 1,∀ i ∈ [n],
and 2) the opinion dynamics where each individual is a
stubborn positive, i.e. fi(xi(t)) = 12 (1 − xi(t)),∀ i ∈ [n].
Due to space limitations, we will not include simulations for
stubborn neutral individuals. The original DeGroot dynamics
and stubborn positive dynamics are shown in Fig. 1 and
Fig. 2 respectively.
We clearly see that the final consensus value is different,
even though the initial conditions and graph topology are
the same. Specifically, the stubborn positive individuals with
xi(0) close to one have low susceptibility, and are reluctant
to change their opinions. On the other hand, individuals with
xi(0) close to minus one are significantly more open to
influence by others. As a result, the final consensus value is
much close in value to one. In other words, while both the
DeGroot model and model with stubborn positives reaches a
consensus of opinions, the polarity of the stubborn positive
individuals results in a more polarized final opinion, closer
to one end of the opinion spectrum. Moreover, the low
susceptibility of the individuals with xi(t) near one signif-
icantly reduces the convergence rate. An interesting future
work is to determine quantitatively the effects of different
susceptibility functions in shifting the final consensus value,
and in altering the convergence rate, when compared to the
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Fig. 1. Evolution of opinions for individuals fully susceptible (original
DeGroot model).
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Fig. 2. Evolution of opinions for stubborn positive individuals (fi(xi(t)) =
1
2
(1− xi(t))).
DeGroot model; the qualitatively effects are obvious from
studying the susceptibility functions themselves.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a discrete-time polar opinion dynamics
model with susceptibility has been studied. We first proposed
a general model and showed it unifies the DeGroot model and
the Friedkin-Johnsen model by considering state-dependent
susceptibility. We then considered specific susceptibility
functions motivated by social examples. Conditions on the
time-varying graph topology, and the initial opinion values,
are given for the social network to reach a consensus.
Necessary and sufficient conditions are given on the initial
opinion values for the social network to reach a consensus on
an extreme opinion at either end of the opinion interval. For
future work, we seek study the case of stubborn extremists,
fi(t) = 1 − xi(t)2, and better understand the behavior of
stubborn neutrals when there are initial opinions on either
side of xi = 0. In addition, we will aim to generalize
stubborn positive, neutral, and extremist functions to so that
their values at the key points xi = −1, 0, 1 are fixed but
may vary smoothly between these points, and consider mixed
individuals in the same network.
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